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ABSTRACT 
The Governors of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and several other states have recently proposed employer 
tax credits as measures to fight high unemployment in their states. Such policies are also being consid-
ered at the federal level. The authors find that such policies, in fact, do little to increase aggregate de-
mand, and instead only modestly reduce the after-tax cost of labor in an economy with high 
unemployment, falling wages, and weak demand They suggest a more effective approach to creating jobs 
in the states: increasing spending in labor-intensive sectors and programs that are matched by federal 
funds, such as Medicaid. These expenditures would be particularly effective if they were financed through 
temporary high-income tax increases. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Governors of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and several other states have recently proposed employer 
tax credits as measures to fight high unemployment in their states. Such policies are also being consid-
ered at the federal level. 
These policies are not likely to have a substantial positive impact on employment generation, either at the 
federal or state level. The obstacles to success for such measures at the state level are particularly high. 
This is because balanced budget requirements and caps on the size of the credits effectively negate the 
potential of state-level employer tax credits to create any jobs, even if the credits are otherwise well-
designed. For effectively fighting the recession and mass unemployment, the fact is that there is no sub-
stitute for effective countercyclical policies operating at the federal level.  At the same time, states can 
generate a small number of additional jobs by increasing spending in labor intensive sectors and on pro-
grams that bring in federal matching funds, particularly if they are willing to use temporary taxes on afflu-
ent households to finance the spending. 
THE TAX CREDIT PROPOSALS  
The Great Recession of 2008-09 has had severe repercussions on the livelihoods of tens of millions of 
people throughout the United States.  More than 8 million jobs have been lost since the nation fell into 
recession in December 2007. Official unemployment stands today at 9.7 percent (February 2010), and 
unemployment is expected to average 8.0 percent even in 2012, according the latest forecast by the 
Congressional Budget Office. While the Obama administration’s $787 billion American Recovery and Re-
investment Act stimulus package has certainly helped, creating 2 million jobs since it was enacted in 
early 2009, it was too small to address the full extent of the economic downturn. Further steps are 
needed if we want to avoid high unemployment for years to come.1  
a. Federal policy 
One of the notable recent policy ideas for generating job growth is the employer tax credit, proposed by 
Tim Bartik, John Bishop and the Economic Policy Institute (EPI). In October 2009 Bartik and Bishop pro-
posed a two-year $190 billion Job Creation Tax Credit (JCTC), which would refund 15% of any payroll taxes 
incurred by added wage costs, whether due to new hires, increased hours, or increased wages.2 Accord-
ing to Bartik and Bishop’s analysis, the JCTC would create 35 new jobs for every $1 million in tax credit 
between 2010 and 2011, with the cost per job falling further if increased income tax payments and de-
creased public benefit receipt for newly employed workers are also taken into consideration.  
In his February State of the Union Address, President Obama laid out a very similar proposal called the 
“Small Business Jobs and Wages Tax Cut” (JWTC). The JWTC would refund $5,000 plus the employer’s 
share of Social Security taxes (6.2 percent of payroll under $106,000) for new hires at expanding firms in 
2010.3 Because the President’s proposal was quite similar to the JCTC, economists at EPI concluded it 
would have roughly the same impact on jobs. The version of the credit that emerged from the House and 
Senate, however, provides only a credit of 6.2 percent of payroll costs for hiring long-term unemployed 
workers in 2010, whether the firms actually expand or not.4 Because of these key differences, Bartik es-
timates this version of tax credit would create only 15 jobs per $1 million in tax credits.5 
b. State policies 
As the federal proposals have been working their way through the political process, several states have 
also introduced versions of these jobs tax credits. Governor Patrick of Massachusetts is proposing a 
$2,500 refundable tax credit for firms with fewer than 50 employees that hire full-time workers and keep 
them employed for at least one year between April 2010 and April 2012.6 The value of the credit is 
capped at $50 million, and since it is refundable and based on withholding tax, the credit will still be 
available to firms that generate no profit.7  
Governor Rell of Connecticut has made a somewhat similar proposal, an expansion of the “Jobs Creation 
Tax Credit Program (JCTCP)” in Connecticut.8 The JCTCP expansion provides $2,500 for each full-time 
employee hired at firms with fewer than 25 employees. Because it is a non-refundable credit against 
state corporate income tax liabilities, it applies only to profitable firms. It applies to hires that occur be-
tween January 2010 and December 2012, and is available to the firm for two years beyond the year of 
the hire.9 So, in practice the $10 million annual cap on the credit could cost the state up to $50 million.  
THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE AND LIMITS OF THE PROPOSALS 
The basic economic rationale behind these proposals is that they would reduce the cost to employers of 
hiring workers. If workers are less costly, employers will have greater incentive to employ them, and this 
could cause firms to do more hiring. Governor Patrick, for example, claims that “this will encourage the 
hiring of up to 20,000 people.” This estimate, however, is simply built by dividing the cap on the credit 
($50 million) by the size of the credit ($2,500) and does not reflect any serious attempt to discern the 
credit’s impact.  
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In practice there is good reason to think the state-level credits will generate very little, if any, hiring of new 
employees. Even the federal credits, which have advantages over the state-level credits, are unlikely to 
generate as many jobs as are being projected. The state-level policies, with small credits, low caps and 
the accompanying balanced budget requirements, will certainly perform far worse.  
POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF A FEDERAL CREDIT 
a. The elasticity of labor demand 
The amount of new employment generated by any federal tax credit is largely a function of the size of the 
credit and how responsive employers are to temporary reductions in total compensation. In the EPI pro-
posal, Bartik and Bishop use a measure of firms’ responsiveness –the ‘own-price elasticity of demand for 
labor’– of 0.3; if compensation declines by 10 percent, firms will increase their demand for labor by 3 per-
cent. This is the “best estimate” of the range of estimates of the long-run elasticity of the demand for labor 
based on Daniel Hamermesh’s seminal work on labor demand.10 In the short-run – more relevant in this 
situation, given the temporary nature of the credit – the elasticity will be lower, however. And in a period of 
particularly weak demand, employers will likely be even less responsive. Using an elasticity from the lower 
end of Hammermesh’s range – 0.15 – the number of jobs per million dollars of credit falls from 35 to 18. 
Estimating the JCTC job creation based on the lower (0.15) elasticity – 18 jobs per million dollars of credit 
– generates results much closer to those in the recent Congressional Budget Office analysis of similar 
employer tax credit proposals.11 The CBO concludes that under any payroll tax cut proposal “most of the 
money forgone by the government would go to reduce employers’ taxes for existing workers, so—per dol-
lar of forgone revenues—the added incentive to increase employment and hours worked would be small.” 
If the payroll tax cut were restricted to firms that were expanding payrolls, the CBO estimates that the pol-
icy would create between 8 and 18 full-time jobs per million dollars of credit.  
b. Analogous and historical policy comparisons 
It is unclear in the current economic environment how responsive firms would actually be to these sorts of 
tax credits. With demand for goods and services seriously depressed, unemployment high and wages fal-
ling, it is not obvious that a tax credit for hiring would actually cause firms to expand their employment 
and operations. Much of the interest in this type of tax credit, however, is based on the perceived success 
of the 1977-78 New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC). Studies by Bishop (1981)and Perloff and Wachter (1979), as 
well as surveys of small businesses (McEvitt, 1978) do provide some evidence that firms added jobs as a 
result of the credit.12  
Yet there is also evidence suggesting caution in interpreting these findings. The new jobs identified by 
these studies were based on the differences in employment gains between firms that knew about the 
NJTC and those that did not. Firms that knew about the credit seemed to grow 3 percent faster than 
those that did not (Perloff and Wachter, 1979). But these studies are unable to rule out the possibility 
that firms knew about the credit because they were already planning to hire new workers.  
Based on an extensive employer survey combined with the payroll records of Wisconsin firms, Tannen-
wald (1982) found that most firms with knowledge of the NJTC did not increase hiring, and that the im-
plied own-price elasticity of the demand for labor in response to the policy was just 0.04.13 Firms did not 
hire because demand for their product simply did not warrant increased production. Tannenwald also 
found that there were also important organizational and informational gaps. At many firms the people 
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doing the hiring had little interaction with the people filing taxes, and the timeframe for hiring is often very 
different than the timeframe for filing taxes.  
Such weak employment impacts are consistent with observation of other policy interventions that affect 
labor costs, in particular raising the minimum wage by modest amounts. The “consensus” view of labor 
economists is that the demand for teenage labor falls one percent in response to an increase in the 
minimum of 10 percent (an elasticity of 0.1), and many studies find the relationship is indistinguishable 
from zero.14  
c. Federal policies and deficit financing 
Federal policies that would reduce the payroll taxes of firms have the potential to increase net employ-
ment during a recession largely because the federal government can engage in deficit spending. In the 
absence of this ability, gross job gains from the credit would be weighed against gross job losses from the 
offsetting budget cuts or tax increases, resulting in a net change in employment much smaller than re-
ported by EPI or the CBO, likely very close to zero. Whether that net increase is positive or negative would 
depend on the responsiveness of the sectors benefiting from the tax credit and the labor intensity of the 
sectors experiencing budget cuts. 
LIMITATIONS OF STATE-LEVEL CREDITS 
State-level impacts from similar policies are likely to be smaller than even the most limited expectations 
at the national level. In their federal proposal, Bartik and Bishop note that state-level versions of these tax 
credits will have little impact on jobs because they are likely to be poorly designed, and any employment 
impacts will be undermined by state budget rules. For a new jobs tax credit to be effective, Bishop warns 
that 1) it needs to be a significant share of labor costs; 2) it should not favor low-wage, high-turnover 
firms, and; 3) there should not be a firm-level cap on the amount of credit that can be received.15 By 
these criteria, “poor design” is a factor in both Massachusetts’ and Connecticut’s proposals, which have 
small credits, are restricted to small (high-turnover) firms, and have low caps on total amount of the 
credit. And all states face balanced budget requirements which will force budget cuts or other tax in-
creases to offset the revenue lost through the credit.  
WASTED EFFORT – REWARDING ALREADY PLANNED EXPANSION 
Even supporters of the federal credits acknowledge that many firms that were already planning on expand-
ing would benefit from the credit. According to EPI’s own analysis, under the best-case scenario, for every 
job created because of the EPI-proposed tax credit in 2010 and 2011, more than six other jobs that were 
already going to be created would also benefit from the credit. This is arguably acceptable at the federal 
level because these benefiting firms may in turn increase their demand for additional workers or other ma-
terials and equipment.16 Moreover since the federal credit does not have a cap, the fact that these al-
ready-expanding firms take the credit does not exclude other firms from expanding because of the credit. 
This is not the case with the state-level credits. By capping the value of the credit, it is possible that the full 
amount budgeted for the credit could be consumed by firms that were already going to expand. 
The credits would be available to any small firm adding net new full-time jobs in Massachusetts between 
April 2010 and April 2012 and any small firm hiring workers in Connecticut between January 2010 and 
December 2012. There is no way for the states to distinguish between jobs added because of the credit 
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and those that would have been added anyway. This is a major problem for the state-level credits, since 
even in a deep recession many firms expand employment and even more engage in replacement hiring.  
The existing volume of hiring and expansion among small firms suggests that much, if not all, of the credit 
could be absorbed by hiring that was already going to happen. Because the state credits are capped, only 
20,000 Massachusetts jobs and 4,000 Connecticut jobs can claim the credit in a single year. The avail-
able data do not allow us to precisely compare recent hiring to the categories laid out in the Connecticut 
and Massachusetts proposals, particularly the requirements for employment tenure and that the jobs 
must be full-time. However, since eighty percent of all jobs are full-time and the job tenure of the typical 
worker is four years, it remains quite possible, given the following data, to conclude that the current level 
of hiring among small firms in Massachusetts and Connecticut will be sufficient to fully absorb the pro-
posed employer tax credits.  
In the second quarter of 2009, Massachusetts added approximately 47,000 jobs at expanding firms with 
fewer than 50 employees and 19,000 jobs at newly created firms with fewer than 50 employees.17 In 
Connecticut 16,000 jobs were added at expanding firms with fewer than 20 employees and 6,900 jobs 
were added at newly created firms with fewer than 20 employees.18  
Because of employment turnover and business closings, we cannot simply multiply quarterly gross job 
gains figures by four to obtain annual estimates. Workers who are hired might later quit or be fired, and 
firms that expand in one quarter might contract in the next. In general, however, for expanding firms of all 
sizes, the level of gross job gains in a given quarter is usually two-thirds of the level of gross job gains 
across an entire year (Table 1). For newly opened firms, the quarterly gross job gains are roughly one-third 
of job gains over an entire year. 
The volume of hiring – relevant here because the Connecticut credit is based on the number of full-time 
hires, not firm expansion – is even greater. Between December 2007 and December 2009 (the most re-
cent data) an average of 52,000 workers were hired each month in Connecticut, and in Massachusetts 
monthly hiring averaged 98,000 workers (Figure 1).19 In spite of all of this hiring, total employment de-
clined steeply over this period because this is less hiring than takes place in an expansion, and because 
layoffs rose.20  
Despite the approximations required by the data, a fairly conservative set of assumptions suggest that 
the existing volume of hiring and expansions at small firms is sufficiently large to absorb the entire of 
amount of the credits being proposed in Massachusetts and Connecticut. If 1) small firm expansion in 
2010 and 2010 remained as low as levels in 2009, 2) quarterly gross jobs gains were 80 percent of an-
nual gains at expanding firms and 65 percent at opening firms, and 3) only half of workers at small firms 
work 35 hours or more per week, there would already be 44,000 jobs eligible for the credit in Massachu-
setts each year and 15,000 in Connecticut, even without the credit. This is more than enough to absorb 
all of the budgeted credits in both states. Since the credits are available first-come-first-serve and even 
more gross job creation is expected in 2010 and 2011, there may be no credit available for firms who 
might actually expand because of the credits’ existence. Knowing this might serve as a major obstacle for 
firms contemplating creating jobs based on the expected benefit of the credit. 
FURTHER LIMITATIONS OF SMALL CREDITS AND THE FOCUS ON SMALL FIRMS 
Facing depressed demand and considerable economic uncertainty, employers are likely to require rela-
tively generous subsidies before expanding payrolls. To the extent that the NJTC of the late 1970s was 
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successful, it was because the $2,100 credit was equal to 22 percent of a typical full-time worker’s an-
nual earnings.21 An equivalent credit in 2009 would be worth nearly $12,000. Today, in Bishop’s estima-
tion, a tax credit needs to be “larger than $3,000 to grab the attention of employers,” and ideally it would 
be more than twice that amount. At $2,500, the credits offered by Massachusetts and Connecticut are 
most likely to be insufficient to grab the attention of employers.  
The CBO also notes that restricting the credit to benefit only small firms will further reduce the impact on 
jobs, because employment at small firms is especially volatile. Given their higher-than-average volume of 
hiring and turnover, directing the credit at small firms would exacerbate the tendency of the program to 
reward job creation that would have occurred anyway. The CBO found that limiting the credit to firms with 
fewer than 100 employees would result in five to ten percent less job growth per dollar spent on a federal 
credit than opening it to all firms.22 If states restrict their credits to even smaller firms (50 employees in 
Massachusetts and 25 in Connecticut), the job impacts will be even smaller.  
REMAINING POTENTIAL FOR GAMING THE CREDITS 
Since the proposed credits in Massachusetts and Connecticut would be available to firms of any organiza-
tional form and do not reward transferring employees between sites or related businesses of a corporation, 
they circumvent some of the more obvious ways a firm might “game” the system. Despite these safe-
guards, the Massachusetts proposal does leave open one unintended consequence. Because the baseline 
for measuring employment growth is March 31st 2010, it would be possible for firms to lay off workers in 
advance of the March 31st cutoff and re-hire them in April. Given the costs of making this adjustment in 
terms of worker morale and lost output and the relatively small size of the credit, it is unlikely that firms 
would actually try to game the system in this way. But this only underscores the fact that the small size of 
the credit makes it unlikely that employers are likely to actually create jobs because of the credit. 
The proposal in Connecticut contains a similar loophole, giving firms the incentive for very short-term hir-
ing. To be eligible for the credit, hires must be employed during, but cannot have been hired in, the last 
month of the year. So, firms that hire a worker in November 2010 and fire them in January 2011 will be 
eligible for the full $2,500 tax credit.  
THE REALITY OF BALANCED BUDGETS 
Massachusetts and Connecticut, along with all states except for Vermont, have balanced budget re-
quirements. Therefore any expenditures on these tax credits will need to be offset by budget cuts or other 
tax increases, effectively undermining any stimulative effect of the credit. In fact, the loss in employment 
(both public and private sector) from budget cuts used to finance the employer tax credits would almost 
certainly be greater than the number of jobs added due to the tax credits. Each million dollars of across-
the-board reductions in state government spending would eliminate more than 18 jobs in each state; $50 
million in reduced spending would eliminate 938 jobs in Massachusetts, and $10 million in reduced 
spending would eliminate 185 in Connecticut (see Table 2).23 These job losses would impact state em-
ployees laid off due to the cuts, private sector employees at firms losing contracts with the state, and 
other private sector workers at companies where business drops off due to reduced customer spending. 
These combined job losses offset the job gains estimated by most of the analyses of even the federal 
employer tax credits. 
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THE TIMING OF THE CREDITS 
Because of the timing of the proposed credits, the current state budgets will not be affected by their 
adoption. In Massachusetts no credits will be paid until April 2012, even for hires that are made as early 
as April 2010. In Connecticut, the non-refundable credits can be used in the following tax year. The intent 
of this design is to give firms an incentive to hire now, when the economy is bad, while allowing state gov-
ernments to defer the costs for another budget cycle. One of the problems with this approach is that state 
budgets are expected to face serious shortfalls for several years. The costs incurred by these employer 
tax credits will lead to real budget cuts and job losses in two or three years. A second problem with delay-
ing the credits is that having to wait so long – up to two years in Massachusetts – to receive the credit 
makes it much less attractive to small firms that are struggling with cash flow in the current economic 
environment.  
THERE IS ONLY ONE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT,  
BUT STATES DO HAVE BETTER OPTIONS THAN EMPLOYER TAX CREDITS 
Given the small size of the credit, the existing volume of hiring and expansion at small firms, and the fact 
the states will have to cut spending in other areas, we cannot expect these credits to create jobs. Given 
the failure of the U.S. Senate to implement an effective second round of economic stimulus, states may 
despair of any productive policy solutions. But while there are no substitutes for federal action, there are 
more productive routes than these employer tax credits.  
a. Education spending 
By shifting existing spending to more labor-intensive areas or toward programs that draw in matching 
federal dollars, states can create new jobs. Education generally and early childhood education in particu-
lar are two labor-intensive sectors where state spending could generate additional job growth. In Massa-
chusetts, 27 jobs are created per million dollars of education spending; in Connecticut, the same funding 
creates 25.5 jobs. Early childhood education spending is even more effective, creating 30 and 33 jobs 
per million dollars in spending, respectively. Shifting $50 million of the general state budget into educa-
tion (including K-12, vocational, and higher education) would generate 413 additional jobs in Massachu-
setts; a comparable shift of $10 million in Connecticut would create 70 jobs (Table 1). Shifting spending 
toward early childhood education alone (including daycare centers, Headstart, and preschool) would cre-
ate 560 jobs in Massachusetts and 148 in Connecticut.  
b. Healthcare spending 
While healthcare is not as labor intensive as education or early childhood education – as shown by the 
jobs per million dollars figures in Table 2 – healthcare spending by state governments does bring in addi-
tional federal dollars to the state. State Medicaid spending has a nearly 62 percent matching rate for 
2010 in both Massachusetts and Connecticut; the federal government finances 62 cents of every dollar 
of Medicaid spending undertaken by the state. Thus a $50 million increase in spending by the state lev-
erages $82 million in additional federal dollars, for a combined $132 million. As a result, $50 million in 
increased Medicaid spending by Massachusetts would create 1,414 jobs, and $10 million in spending 
would create 271 jobs in Connecticut.  
c. Infrastructure spending 
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Because it is relatively capital intensive, spending on infrastructure projects will not create as many jobs 
as spending in these other sectors, at least in the short run. In the absence of matching funds, shifting 
existing spending toward infrastructure projects would actually result in a decline in jobs in Massachu-
setts and Connecticut. The inherent value of infrastructure projects in a recession is that they enhance 
the long-term productivity of the state’s economy, and do so utilizing the labor and equipment of sectors 
that are disproportionately impacted in downturn. However, infrastructure projects frequent generate 
federal or private matching funds. If infrastructure investments were accompanied by significant match-
ing funds (close to 40 percent of total costs), they would then generate additional employment beyond 
the existing pattern of state government spending.  
d. Financing state spending 
If states financed this additional spending by raising taxes on affluent households instead of simply shift-
ing spending out of other areas, they could create a somewhat greater number of new jobs. Since low-
income households generally spend nearly every dollar they earn, additional taxes on those households 
reduce consumer spending dollar for dollar. Affluent households, however, save considerable portions of 
their incomes; temporary tax increases on those households would reduce spending somewhat, but much 
less than dollar for dollar.24 Conservative estimates from research on consumer responses to changes in 
income and social security taxes suggest that affluent households might reduce their consumption by up 
to half of the amount of a temporary tax increase.25  
If additional spending on education and healthcare is financed by temporary taxes on high-income 
households (with incomes above $150,000), the impact on job creation will be somewhat greater than if 
the spending is based on simply shifts the existing budget. Financed in this way, spending $50 million in 
Massachusetts would generate 2,096 jobs in the health care sector, 1,096 jobs in education, 1,243 jobs 
in early childhood education, or 347 jobs in infrastructure. Spending $10 million in Connecticut would 
produce 409 jobs in the health care sector, 208 jobs in education, 286 jobs in early childhood education, 
or 69 jobs in infrastructure. 
CONCLUSION 
Since they do little to increase aggregate demand, and instead only modestly reduce the after-tax cost of 
labor in an economy with high unemployment, falling wages, and weak demand, even the federal em-
ployer tax credit proposals should not be expected to dramatically increase employment. Because the 
state proposals are small, targeted to small firms, and capped at relatively low levels they can be ex-
pected to generate little, if any, gross job gains. The credits are not generous enough to motivate firms 
that weren’t already planning on hiring to do so, and will possibly be entirely consumed by the existing 
volume of hiring and expansion at small firms. Since the state credits have to be financed under a bal-
anced budget, they cannot be expected to cause net increases in employment. The job losses resulting 
from decreased state spending will almost certainly outstrip the number of jobs created by the credits. A 
more effective approach to creating jobs in the states would be to increase spending in labor-intensive 
sectors and programs that are matched by federal funds, such as Medicaid. These expenditures would be 
particularly effective if they were financed through temporary high-income tax increases. 
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Source: PERI analysis of BLS JOLTS data.
Figure 1a. Hiring in Massachusetts
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Figure 1b. Hiring in Connecticut
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1994 113,354 52,286 207,478 102,411 69,093 16,678 128,569 32,437 61% 32% 62% 32%
1995 117,374 55,992 227,401 105,661 75,412 15,961 148,509 40,770 64% 29% 65% 39%
1996 109,188 57,761 223,640 104,134 78,283 18,392 144,227 38,393 72% 32% 64% 37%
1997 133,943 65,751 235,949 116,948 91,277 16,379 157,014 37,448 68% 25% 67% 32%
1998 128,349 56,298 244,150 109,312 85,935 17,043 153,543 42,538 67% 30% 63% 39%
1999 129,906 55,916 240,505 119,361 86,965 16,977 159,660 41,991 67% 30% 66% 35%
2000 126,870 52,941 265,811 118,219 87,458 19,850 177,441 38,156 69% 37% 67% 32%
2001 119,213 45,676 274,926 109,342 75,804 16,521 171,513 37,450 64% 36% 62% 34%
2002 105,199 47,188 209,823 90,028 72,563 12,774 149,238 40,685 69% 27% 71% 45%
2003 88,351 39,260 187,661 88,921 61,779 11,814 132,152 37,932 70% 30% 70% 43%
2004 100,883 37,022 192,228 73,375 69,043 14,575 137,588 31,286 68% 39% 72% 43%
2005 101,986 39,920 189,690 80,933 66,652 16,714 127,609 35,113 65% 42% 67% 43%
2006 102,740 36,810 206,581 74,240 69,088 11,035 131,672 28,234 67% 30% 64% 38%
2007 102,231 36,501 201,199 73,782 65,705 12,178 129,828 30,551 64% 33% 65% 41%
2008 104,292 33,749 196,149 74,193 68,268 9,096 129,180 30,751 65% 27% 66% 41%
2009 77,656 28,989 151,141 57,709 53,746 8,609 98,552 22,806 69% 30% 65% 40%
Source: PERI  analys is  of BLS Bus iness  Employment Dynamics  data.
Table 1. Quarterly and Annual Gross Job Gains in Massachusetts and Connecticut, All Firm Sizes
Annual  Gross  Job Gains  (Over the  12‐month period 
ending in the  1st Quarter) Quarterly Job Gains  (In the  First Quarter) Quarterly gains  as  Share  of Annual  Gains
Connecticut Connecticut ConnecticutMassachusetts Massachusetts Massachusetts
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Funding level 
($million)
Total jobs,  
funding level
Total jobs per 
$1 million
Direct jobs per 
$1 million
Indirect jobs 
per $1 million
Induced jobs 
per $1 million
Net Jobs, shift in 
state spending
Net Jobs, increased 
taxes on upper 
income brackets
State Spending and 
Investment (total 
jobs per $1 million)
Personal 
Consumption 
(Households 
$150k+), jobs per $1 
million* 
Healthcare 130 2,352 18.06 11 1.9 5.16 1,414 2,096 18.76 10.22
Education 50 1,351 27.02 17.2 2.1 7.72 413 1,096 18.76 10.22
ChildCare 50 1,498 29.96 19.4 2 8.56 560 1,243 18.76 10.22
SL investment 50 602 12.04 6.7 1.9 3.44 ‐336 347 18.76 10.22
Funding level 
($million)
Total jobs,  
funding level
Total jobs per 
$1 million
Direct jobs per 
$1 million
Indirect jobs 
per $1 million
Induced jobs 
per $1 million
Net Jobs, shift in 
state spending
Net Jobs, increased 
taxes on upper 
income brackets
State Spending and 
Investment (total 
jobs per $1 million)
Personal 
Consumption 
(Households 
$150k+), jobs per $1 
million* 
Healthcare 26 456 17.5 10.7 1.8 5 271 409 18.48 9.38
Education 10 255 25.48 16.2 2 7.28 70 208 18.48 9.38
ChildCare 10 333 33.32 21.9 1.9 9.52 148 286 18.48 9.38
SL investment 10 116 11.62 6.6 1.7 3.32 ‐69 69 18.48 9.38
Source: PERI and IMPLAN 2007
Notes:
Healthcare includes matching funds from fed govt at rate of 0.616 fed dollars for each state dollar
Education includes primary, secondary, college/university, and other (such as trade schools)
ChildCare includes daycare centers, home care, headstart, pre‐school, and other modes of child care
State and Local investment includes infrastructure spending on buildings, roads, computer equipment, etc.
*For households >$150k, fall in personal consumption is 50% total tax increase.  This assumes symmetry between tax rebate and tax increase consumption effects.
Massachusetts ($50 million credit) Net Employment Effects ‐ Massachusetts
Connecticut ($10 million credit) Net Employment Effects ‐ Connecticut
Table 2. State Spending Multipliers: Alternatives to the Payroll Tax Rebate
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1 See the assessments of ARRA by the Council of Economic Advisers and the Congressional Budget Office. Available at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/100113-economic-impact-arra-second-quarterly-report.pdf and 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/110xx/doc11044/02-23-ARRA.pdf. 
2 See Bartik, Tim and John Bishop, “The Job Creation Tax Credit,” Economic Policy Institute, October 20, 2009: 
http://www.epi.org/publications/entry/bp248/. 
3 See Bivens, Josh, “Jobs and Wages Tax Cut Should be Part of a New Jobs Package”, February 4, 2010: 
http://www.epi.org/publications/entry/pm158/. 
4 Both bills also include an additional $1,000 credit for employers’ income taxes if the jobs are year-round and last for at 
least one year. 
5 Bartik, Tim, “Not All Job Creation Credits are Created Equal,” EPI, February 12, 2010. 
http://www.epi.org/analysis_and_opinion/entry/not_all_job_creation_tax_credits_are_created_equal/ 
6 The Massachusetts credit requires the net increase in employment at the firm must be maintained for a year, not that the 
individual worker must remain with the firm for one year. 
7 Governor Patrick’s proposal is available at: 
http://www.mass.gov/Agov3/docs/Legislation/02102010%20Job%20Creation%20Bill.pdf. 
8 Governor Rell’s proposed tax credit is describe at: http://www.ct.gov/governorrell/cwp/view.asp?A=3872&Q=455212. 
9 Hire eligible for the Connecticut credit must be employed in, but cannot have been hired during December. In the second 
and third years of the credit expansion (2011 and 2012), hires made during the last six months of the year are only eligible 
for a credit of $1,250.  
10 Hamermesh, Daniel, 1993. Labor Demand. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 
11 CBO, “Policies for Increasing Economic Growth and Employment in 2010 and 2011,” January 2010. 
12 Bishop, John, 1981. “Employment in Construction and Distribution Industries: The Impact of the New Jobs Tax Credit,” in 
Sherwin Rosen, ed., Studies in Labor Markets (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1981), pp. 209–
246. Perloff, Jeffrey and Michael Wachter, 1979. “The New Jobs Tax Credit: An Evaluation of the 1977-78 Wage Subsidy 
Program,” American Economic Review (May): 173-79, and McKevitt, James, 1978. Jobs Tax Credit. Testimony at Joint Hear-
ings before the Subcommittee on 
Administration of the Internal Revenue Code and Senate Select Small Business committee, 95th 
Congress 2nd session (Government Printing Office, 1978) 179-196. 
13 Tannenwald, Robert, 1982. “Are Wage and Training Subsidies Cost-Effective? – Some Evidence from the New Jobs Tax 
Credit,” New England Economic Review, September/October 1982, 25-34. 
14 The “consensus” view here is reflected in the survey of labor and public economists conducted by Fuchs, Krueger, and 
Poterba (Fuchs, Victor, Alan Krueger, and James Poterba, 1998. “Economists’ View about Parameters, Values and Policies: 
Survey Results in Labor and Public Economics, Journal of Economic Literature Vol. 36, 1387-1425. Also see the classic 
work by David Card and Alan Krueger (Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage, 1995) as well 
as more recent studies by Dube et al and Doucouliagos and Stanley (Doucouliagos, Hristos, and T. D. Stanley. 2009. “Pub-
lication Selection Bias in Minimum-Wage Research? A Meta-Regression Analysis.” British Journal of Industrial Relations 47 
(2): 406-28; Dube, Andrajit, T. William Lester, and Michael Reich. 2007. “Minimum Wage Effects Across State Borders: 
Estimates Using Contiguous Counties.” Institute for Research on Labor and Employment Working Paper Series No. iirwps-
157-07. 
15 Bishop, John, 2008. “Can a Tax Credit for Employment Growth in 2009 and 2010 Restore Animal Spirits and Help Jump 
Start the Economy?” Cornell University IRL Discussion Paper. 
16 Bivens, Josh, 2010. “Jobs and Wages Tax Cut Should be Part of a New Jobs Package,” Economic Policy Institute, Policy 
Memorandum #158, February 4, 2010. 
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17 The BLS Business Employment Dynamics (BED) data are available by firm size at the federal level, but only for all firms 
sizes combined at the state level. These small firm job creation estimates are based on the assumption that the distribu-
tion of gross job creation among small firms mirrors that of expanding firms of all sizes. 
18 While the Connecticut credit is available to firms with 25 or fewer employees, the closest size class in the BLS data is for 
firms with 20 or fewer employees. 
19 These figures are based on analysis of the BLS JOLTS data, which are not available at the state level, only regionally. The 
Massachusetts figure assigns 13 percent of Northeast hires to Massachusetts, based on the state’s state of total employ-
ment in the Northeast between 1998 and 2008. 
20 The state of Massachusetts’ own Job Vacancy Survey shows that there was an average of 50,000 active job openings 
during the 2nd quarter of 2009. http://lmi2.detma.org/Lmi/pdf/JobVac2009Q2.pdf 
21 Bishop, 2008. 
22 CBO, February 3, 2010 
23 The estimates of employment gains and losses due to changes in state government policy changes in Massachusetts 
and Connecticut, reported in Table 1, are derived from an input-output model. The input-output model allows us to observe 
relationships between different industries in the production of goods and services. We can also observe relationships be-
tween consumers of goods and services, including households and governments, and the various producing industries. For 
our purposes specifically, the input-output modeling approach enables us to estimate the effects on employment resulting 
from an increase in government expenditures for the products or services of a given industry. For example, we can estimate 
the number of jobs directly created in the education industry for each $1 million of spending on education. We can also 
estimate the jobs that are indirectly created in other industries through the $1 million in spending on education—industries 
such as textbook publishing and school building construction. Overall, the input-output model allows us to estimate the 
economy-wide employment results from a given level of spending. For this report, we used the IMPLAN 2.0 software and 
IMPLAN 2007 state-level data. This data provides 440-industry level detail and is based on the Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis (BEA) input-output tables.  
24 According to the most recent data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, just 34 percent of low-income households (bot-
tom fifth of the income distribution) had any savings in 2007, while 85 percent of high-income households (top ten percent 
of the income distribution) had savings. The typical (median) net worth (assets less debts) was $8,100 among low-income 
households, while it was more than $1.1 million for those with high incomes. Data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey 
(2008) show that low-income households actually spend more than they make (after-tax income), while high-income house-
holds spend just 64 percent of their income on average. For more detail on savings of affluent households and the relative 
benefits of temporary progressive taxes during a downturn, see Carroll, Christopher, 1998. “Why Do the Rich Save So Much,” 
NBER Working Paper #6549; Dynan, Karen, Jonathan Skinner, and Stephen Zeldes, 2000. “Do the Rich Save More?” NBER 
Working Paper #7906; Orszag, Peter and Joseph Stiglitz, 2001. “Budget Cuts Vs. Tax Increases at the State Level: Is one 
more counter-productive than the other During a Recession?” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, November 6, 2001.  
25 A number of studies have found that consumption does respond to tax changes, and that the response is smaller among 
higher-income households. Johnson et al (2006) find that high-income households spent roughly half of their 2001 income 
tax rebate on nondurable goods, while Parker (1999) showed that when the earnings of high-income households rose be-
yond the social security payroll tax cap, spending increased by one half of the predictable increase in after-tax income. 
(Johnson, David, Jonathan Parker, and Nicholas Souleles, 2006. “Household Expenditure and the Income Tax Rebates of 
2001,” American Economic Review, Vol. 96(5), 1589-1610; Parker, Jonathan, “The Reaction of Household Consumption to 
Predictable Changes in Social Security Taxes.” American Economic Review, Vol. 89(4), 959-73.) For several reasons, we 
consider the 50 percent reduction in spending by high-income households under a temporary tax increase to be fairly con-
servative. For one thing, households at the $69,000 considered by Johnson et al (2006) and at the Social Security cap 
considered by Parker (1999) are much closer to middle-income than high-income. These households will find it harder to 
maintain their desired level of consumption than households with incomes above $150,000 that we are considering here. 
In addition, the evidence in Johnson et al (2006) and Parker (1999) is based on consumer responses to a tax rebate. For 
affluent households, spending out of tax rebates will arguably be greater than reductions in spending out of temporary tax 
increases. This will be the case if the rebate is viewed as a one-off source of found money that can be spent on an extrava-
gance, while the household is loathe to reduce its standard of living in response to a temporary tax increase.  
